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THE EFFECTS OF HENSLEY v. ECKERHART
ON THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
E. Wayne Powell*
I. Introduction
Under the American rule,' prevailing litigants in the United States
traditionally have not been entitled to collect attorney's fees from
the unsuccessful party.2 However, Congress has enacted fee-shifting
exemptions to this rule.' These exceptions, which began with leg-
islative provisions to allow federal courts to follow state practice in
*University of Richmond, B.A., 1972; University of Wisconsin, M.A., 1973; T.C.
Williams School of Law, J.D., 1980; The author is Deputy Commissioner of the
Industrial Commission of Virginia.
1. According to the "American Rule," attorney's fees are not generally re-
coverable as costs or damages in the absence of a statute or an agreement between
the parties. Rather, parties are required to bear their own attorney's fees. See F.D.
Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 128-31
(1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-9 (1973); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). In Fleischmann, the Supreme Court stated that:
As early as 1278, the courts of England were authorized to award counsel
fees to successful plaintiffs in litigation. Similarly, since 1607 English
courts have been empowered to award counsel fees to defendants in all
actions where such awards might be made to plaintiffs. Rules governing
administration of these and related provisions have developed over the
years. It is now customary in England, after litigation of substantive
claims has terminated, to conduct separate hearings before special "taxing
Masters" in order to determine the appropriateness and the size of an
award of counsel fees. To prevent the ancillary proceedings from becoming
unduly protracted and burdensome, fees which may be included in an
award are usually prescribed ....
386 U.S. at 717 (citations omitted).
Contrary to the "American Rule" is the "English.Rule" which awards attorney's
fees to prevailing litigants. See generally Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851-54(1929); Note, Theories of Recovering Attorneys' Fees: Exceptions to the American
Rule, 47 UMKC L. REV. 566, 566-67 (1979).
For a discussion of the reasons why the "English Rule" was never adopted
in the United States, see generally Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees
and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792, 798-99 (1966); Goodhart, supra, at
873; Note, Attorneys' Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L.
REV. 1216, 1220 (1967).
2. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975);
see supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §
1988 (1981) which states, in relevant part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318,
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the award of attorney's fees, 4 further allowed the Supreme Court
to prescribe costs5 and resulted in standardization of costs in federal
litigation. 6 More recently, Congress has allowed the courts to award
reasonable attorney's fees under selected statutes which are designed
to protect various federal rights.7
or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id.
The Act has been construed broadly to achieve Congress' remedial purpose of
encouraging compliance with the civil rights laws. Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302,
1306 (9th Cir. 1980); Mid Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34,
36 (2d Cir. 1978).
Section 1988's most widely recognized purpose is facilitation of access to the
courts by civil rights plaintiffs by elimination cf financial barriers. Mesolella v.
City of Providence, 578 F. Supp. 387, 389 (D.R.l. 1984); Kaimowitz v. Howard,
547 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (D. Mich. 1982), aff'd, 751 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1984);
Maryland Nat. Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Crawford, 59 Md. App. 276,
475 A.2d 494, 507 n.12 (Ct. of Special Appeals 1984). See generally Rowe, The
Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651-
80 (1982) for a consideration of the rationales underlying a fee-shifting rule.
4. See Act of March 1, 1793, § 4, 1 Stat. 333 which states "[t]hat there be
allowed and taxed in the supreme, circuit and district courts of the United States,
in favour of the parties obtaining judgments therein, such compensation . . . for
attornies [sic] and counsellors' fees, . . . as are allowed in the supreme or superior
courts of the respective states." Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 248-49 n.19.
For an interesting approach to awards of attorneys' fees in the state law area,
see Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977),
which held that Aleyska did not preclude attorneys' fee awards in cases dealing
with constitutional rights.
Several states have provided by statute for recovery of attorneys' fees. ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.60.010, 09.60.015(a) (1984); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1021.5, 1021.6
(West Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 18.010 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-
31 (1974); OR. REV. STAT. § 20.080 (1983).
5. See Act of August 23, 1842, § 7, 5 Stat. 518 which states, in relevant part:
That, for the purpose of further diminishing the costs and expenses in
suits and proceedings in the said courts, the Supreme Court shall have
full power and authority, from time to time, to make and prescribe
regulations to the said district and circuit courts, as to the taxation and
payment of costs in all suits and proceedings therein; and to make and
prescribe a table of the various items of costs which shall be taxable
and allowed in all suits ....
Id.
6. H.R. REP. No. 50, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. (1852); 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (Supp.
II 1946 ed.); 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a) (Supp. II 1946 ed.).
7. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 11, § 204(b), 78 Stat. 261, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) and Title VII, § 706K, 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-5
(1981). Section 2000a-3(b) states: "In any action commenced pursuant to this
subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-
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Certain inherent equitable judicial perogatives have coexisted with
these statutory provisions. For example, the Supreme Court has
permitted a party preserving a fund or trust for the benefit of others
as well as himself to recover a reasonable attorney's fee. 8 A court
also may assess attorney's fees for a party's willful disobedience of
a court order9 or when the losing party acts in bad faith or for
oppressive reasons.' 0 The Supreme Court first held in 1796 that the
judiciary itself would not, independent of a statute, create a rule
allowing awards of attorney's fees in actions brought in federal
3(b) (1981); see also Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968) (court held that one who succeeds in obtaining injunctive relief against racial
discrimination under this statute should receive attorney's fees unless special cir-
cumstances render award unjust); Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d
534, 537 (5th Cir. 1970) (court noted that congressional purpose would be frustrated
if attorney's fees were only allowed in exceptional cases); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1981) (person injured by virtue of an antitrust violation "shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee"); Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1981) ("court may,
in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit,
including reasonable attorney's fees . . ."); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77www(a) (1981) ("court may . . . require an undertaking for the payment of
the costs of such suit and assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys'
fees . . ."); Consumer Product Warranties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (1982)
("consumer ... may be allowed by the court to recover ... (attorneys' fees based
on actual time expended) . . ."); Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612(c) (1977) ("court may grant as relief, . . . reasonable attorney fees in the
case of a prevailing plaintiff: Provided, That the said plaintiff in the opinion of
the court is not financially able to assume said attorney's fees"); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1983) ("court . . . may not award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award
is appropriate").
8. The "common benefit" exception is detailed in Trustees v. Greenough, 105
U.S. 527 (1881). In Greenough, a bondholder, through expensive litigation, saved
a substantial amount of security pledged to pay interest on the bonds, which created
a fund in which other bondholders shared. The Supreme Court held that a court
has discretion to allow reimbursement of the successful litigant from the fund "or
by proportional contribution from those who accepted the benefit of his efforts."
Id. at 533. See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees
from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974).
For examples of application of the common benefit rule, see Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 283
U.S. 738 (1931); Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1886); Central R.R.
and Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885). See generally Dawson, Lawyers
and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974).
9. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258; see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
10. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59; see F.D. Rich Co., 417 U.S. at 129. This
exception, which is punitive in nature, requires a showing of bad faith on the part
of the unsuccessful litigant. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). The question of
whether the circumstances warrant invoking the exception is left to the discretion
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courts.1 The Court later reaffirmed the firmly established American
Rule and the limited exceptions to it in Alyeska v. Wilderness
Society. 2 In Alyeska, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's
award of attorney's fees to the respondent ecological groups which
succeeded in obtaining permanent injunctive relief against the issuance
of right of way permits for the construction of the Alyeska Oil
Pipeline. 3 The Court's rejection of the court of appeals' use of the
"private attorney general"'' 4 rationale to justify the fee award"5
of the court. Resolution of the case against a party by itself, is insufficient to
warrant a finding of bad faith. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 183 (1976).
11. Arcanbel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
12. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 240. Other Supreme Court decisions affirming the use
of the "American Rule" include F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial
Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967); Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U.S. 497, 511
(1902); Flanders v. Tweed, 15 Wall. 450 (1873); Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363
(1851).
13. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 241-46. The plaintiffs in the case, citizens' environmental
organizations, sued to prevent the issuance of permits by the Secretary of the
Interior for the construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline and prevailed in the
district court. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970). Sub-
sequent to the litigation, however, congressional legislation was passed which allowed
permits to be granted which were sought by an intervening pipeline corporation.
1920 Mineral Leasing Act, 41 Stat. 449 (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976)).
The plaintiffs then requested and were granted expenses and attorney's fees based
upon the court of appeals' equitable powers and the fact that the plaintiffs were
performing the services of a private attorney general. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton,
495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court stated that "[slubstantial benefits to
the general public should not depend upon the financial status of the individual
volunteering to serve as plaintiff or upon the charity of public-minded lawyers."
Id. at 1030; see also infra note 14. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine the appropriateness of the award of attorney's fees.
14. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 246. The private attorney general theory of awarding
attorney's fees is designed to encourage private plaintiffs to vindicate policies which
Congress has considered to be of the highest priority; to invoke such theory the
court must be convinced that a policy is involved which Congress accords the
highest priority and that an award of attorney's fees will further encourage the
vindication of that policy. Rappaport v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 65 F.R.D.
545, 550 (D.C. Del. 1975). Generally, three factors must be taken into consideration
in determining propriety of employment of private attorney general theory as a
vehicle to award attorney's fees: "(a) effectuation of a strong congressional policy;
(b) necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, and (c) the number of
individuals benefited by the plaintiff's efforts." Lytle v. Comm'r of Election of
Union County, 65 F.R.D. 699, 704 (D.S.C. 1975). See generally Note, Awards of
Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 277, 284-86 (1982);
Note, Theories of Recovering Attorneys' Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule,
47 UMKC L. REV. 566, 576-81 (1979) for a discussion of the private attorney
general exception to the "American Rule."
15. The appellate court held that the ecological groups had expended considerable
time and labor on behalf of the public to protect the environment. See Alyeska,
421 U.S. at 246.
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effectively destroyedthe viability. of this exception to the American
Rule.
The Supreme Court stated that the Alyeska fee had not been
awarded in accordance with any of the equitable or statutory ex-
ceptions to the American Rule.1 6 It further noted that congressional
utilization of the "private attorney general" rationale did not im-
pliedly grant power to the judiciary to disregard the traditional
American Rule. 7 The Court refused to apply the "private attorney
general" theory absent congressional guidance in the form of fee-
shifting statutes."8
Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees
Award Act of 1976 (CRAFAA), 9 which amended the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 to "remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws
created by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
A lyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, . . . and to
achieve consistency in our civil rights laws. "20 The legislature stressed
the important public policy goal accomplished by promoting citizen
or "private attorneys general" vindication of civil rights by allowing
those citizen to recover the cost of their litigation.2 1
16. Id. at 258, 259, 260, 262, 269. See supra notes 4, 18 and accompanying
text for discussion of the exceptions.
17. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 262-63.
18. Id. at 247. See supra note 7 for a partial listing of federal statutes with
fee shifting provisions.
19. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1981)); S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5909. See supra note
3 for text of the statute.
20. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5909.
21. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 2-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5912. Senator Edward Kennedy, advocating inclusion of a fee-shifting
provision in the CRAFAA, stated:
The bill now before us ... does not create any new legal remedies, nor
does it expand our civil rights laws into new areas which Congress has
not previously considered. It merely lends substance to the private en-
forcement of rights already authorized under existing civil rights laws. ...
It is a fundamental axiom of law that where there is a right the law
should provide' a remedy. Yet, without a provision to permit awards of
attorneys' fees to successful parties, the rights secured by those civil
rights laws covered by this act are hollow rights indeed. Enactment of
this legislation would do much to assure all the citizens of this Nation
that the words "equal protection of law" mean what they say, and that
Congress firmly intends that all our civil rights laws be vigorously en-
forced.
122 CONG. REc. S31472 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976).
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Since the passage of CRAFAA, courts have awarded substantial
fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 22 The "prevailing party" standard has
been considerably less onerous for plaintiffs than for prevailing
defendents who can obtain fees only when the plaintiff's actions
are "frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harassment purposes. ' 23
For example, in the area of civil rights cases brought under section
22. For examples of cases where plaintiffs success on the merits was a reason
to award attorney's fees, see Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 708 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir.
1983); Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 521 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981); Gates v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 581 F. Supp. 204, 210 (N.D. Ohio
1984). Complete success on the merits generally has not been a requirement for
plaintiff to recover. See, e.g., Larsen v. Sielaff, 702 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 372 (1983) (failure to achieve clear victory did not preclude
award of attorney's fees to prevailing party); De Mier v. Gondles, 676 F.2d 92,
93 (4th Cir. 1982) (need not obtain final judgment in order to be deemed prevailing
party for purposes of obtaining attorney's fees); Thompson v. Penna. Parole Bd.
Member Jefferson, 544 F. Supp. 173, 175 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (to be prevailing party
for purposes of § 1988, it is not necessary to have received final judgment). But
see Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 652 (7th Cir. 1981) (party is not
entitled to attorney fees until he has prevailed, at least partially, on the merits);
Coalition for Basic Human Needs v. King, 535 F. Supp. 126, 129 (D. Mass.) (to
recover attorney's fees, party must demonstrate that he prevailed in legal sense),
vacated in part on other grounds, 691 F.2d 597 (1st Cir. 1982).
However, the third, fifth and ninth circuits have interpreted CRAFAA to allow
a fee award only where a party has prevailed on the central issue. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465-67 (5th Cir. 1981); Watkins v. Mobile
Hous. Bd., 632 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Swietlowich v. County
of Bucks, 620 F.2d 33, 34 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d
411, 414-15 (3d Cir. 1979); Iranian Students Ass'n v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353
(5th Cir. 1979); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897-98 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980).
23. Senate Report, supra note 19, at 4-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 5912; see, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 421 (1978) ("district court iiay in its discretion award attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's action
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in
subjective bad faith"); United States v. Davis, 747 F.2d 440, 448 (8th Cir. 1984)
(recovery of fees allowed where suit is vexatiously brought); Latz Realty Co. v.
U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, 717 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1983) (in
order to receive attorney's fees, prevailing defendant must show that plaintiff's
claim was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless); Fonti v. Petropoulous, 656 F.2d
212, 219 (6th Cir. 1981) (where plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable and
without foundation, award of attorney's fees against plaintiff was proper); Molgaard
v. Town of Caledonia, 539 F. Supp. 571, 572 (E.D. Wisc. 1982) (standard of
allowance of attorney's fees for prevailing defendant in civil rights action is stricter
than for prevailing plaintiff); Life Science Church v. Vocke, 531 F. Supp. 790,
792-93 (E.D. Wisc. 1982) (prevailing defendant may recover upon finding that
plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation).
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1983,24 state employees may be subject to few provable damages but
may face staggering attorney's fees.25 In civil rights litigation as well
as other areas involving federally protected rights, 26 the federal courts
have developed varying standards for determining prevailing parties
and reasonable fees.27 Consequently, defendants may be hampered
by their inability to gauge total liability in cases where a fee award
bears little relationship to the value of the prevailing party's case
on the merits or the degree of success attained.
The Supreme Court's decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart,28 focused
on the correlation between the degree of success of prevailing plain-
tiffs and the amount of the attorney's fees awarded. 9 Specifically,
the issue in Hensley was whether a "partially prevailing plaintiff
may recover an attorney's fee for legal services on unsuccessful
claims."30
This Article discusses the effects on fee awards of the concepts
of "reasonableness" in the circuits employing the elements set forth
in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc." and other criteria
between the time of Alyeska and Hensley. 2 Next, it sets forth the
special circumstances which may preclude the granting of awards,33
examines the Hensley decision,34 and considers some recent trends
in fee awards resulting from Hensley. 5 This Article concludes that
Hensley fails to clarify the problem of attorney's fees for the partially
prevailing plaintiff but is important as a reaffirmation of Alyeska
and the American Rule.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
25. See generally Note, Federal Statutory Rights-Scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983-
Attorney's Fees-Maine v. Thiboutot, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 686-88 (1981-1982)
(discussing expansion of § 1983 actions by Supreme Court's decision in Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)). The Court noted in Thiboutot that claims against
state and local government entities could be based on a violation of any federal
law, not just the U.S. Constitution or federal civil rights statutes. 448 U.S. at 4.
26. See supra note 25. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides for a cause
of action resulting from the deprivation of rights secured both by the U.S. Con-
stitution and the "laws of the United States."
27. See infra Section 11.
28. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
29. Id. at 438.
30. Id. at 426.
31. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
32. See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Section III.
34. See infra Section IV.
35. See infra Section V.
1985]
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II. Status of Attorneys' Fees Awards From 1976-1983
A. Reasonableness of Fee Award
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.3 6 was among the seminal
federal cases dealing with the "reasonableness" of the size of fee
awards prior to Hensley. In Johnson,37 a class of employees alleging
employment discrimination successfully sued under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.138 Under section 706(k) of Title VII,19 which
is almost identical to the CRAFAA, the prevailing plaintiffs argued
that the amount of time an attorney spent justified the $30,145.50
award requested. The district court found that, given counsel's ex-
perience, the "reasonable" attorney rate for that geographical area
merited a fee award of $13,500. 40
The appellate court, acknowledging the district court's discretion
in setting the award, stated that congressional policy supporting the
fee-shifting statute required the court to elaborate on the basis for
its decision.4 ' Without questioning the appropriateness of the amount
awarded, the appellate court cautioned that the court should not
utilize section 706(k) to make the prevailing counsel rich.41
The court remanded with instructions for the lower court to
consider the following elements in its decision on fees: (1) time and
labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) skill
required to perform the legal service properly; (4) preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5)
customary fee in the community; (6) whether the fee was fixed or
contingent; (7) time limitation imposed by the client or the circum-
stances; (8) amount involved and the results attained; (9) experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) "undesirability" of the
36. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
37. Id. at 715.
38. Title VII § 701, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1981).
39. Section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that
"[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs" of litigation. 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1981).
40. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 714. See infra note 43 and accompanying text for
listing of relevant factors. The Johnson elements are derived from the American
Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-106.
41. Id. at 716.
42. Id. at 719-20. The court noted that "[tihe statute was not passed for the
benefit of attorneys but to enable litigants to obtain competent counsel worthy of
a contest with the caliber of counsel available to their opposition and to fairly
place the economic burden of Title VII litigation." Id. at 719.
[Vol. XIII
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case; (11) nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client; and (12) awards in similar cases within or without the
circuit .41
The Johnson elements have been adopted unanimously by the
federal courts." Since an attorney fee award will not be overturned
absent a clear abuse of discretion by the district court, 45 there has
been no occasion for the circuits to adopt consistent methods for
determining reasonable fee awards.
B. Fee Enhancement
In Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American
Radiation & Standard Sanitary Corp. ,46 the third circuit developed
the concept of the "lodestar ' 47 as a means to provide a basis for
the valuation of attorney's fees. 48 The court defined the "lodestar"
concelt as the amount determined to constitute reasonable com-
pensation for the attorney's services, computed by multiplying the
43. Id. at 717-19.
44. See, e.g., National Council of Commun. Health Centers, Inc. v. Mathews,
546 F.2d 1003, 1009 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1976); King v. Greenblat,
560 F.2d 1024, 1026 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Prate v.
Freedman, 583 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1978); Estien v. Christian, 507 F.2d 61, 64
(3d Cir. 1975); Barber v. Kimbrells, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 934 (1978); Gamble v. Birmington Southern R.R. Co., 514 F.2d 678,
686 (5th Cir. 1975); Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 611
F.2d 624, 642 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); Hampton v.
Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1979), modified, 446 U.S. 754, reh'g denied,
448 U.S. 913 (1980); Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 548 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 496 (9th
Cir. 1978); In re Permian Anchor Servs., 649 F.2d 763, 768 (10th Cir. 1981);
Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 332 (lth Cir. 1982).
45. Whitley v. Seibel, 676 F.2d 245, 253-54 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 942 (1982); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 637 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g
denied, 669 F.2d 729, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 977 (1982); O'Neil v. City of Lake
Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1981); Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School
Dist., 608 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir. 1979).
46. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy I); see 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lindy
11). See also infra note 51 for discussion of the procedural history.
47. Id. at 168. See generally Note, Civil Rights-Attorney's Fees- When Lodestar
Adjusting Factors are Considered in Initial Lodestar Computation, No Abuse of
Discretion for District Court to Reject Further Adjustments Based Upon Same
Factors, 53 Miss. L.J. 679-90 (1983) (author discusses lodestar concept developed
in Lindy I, id. at 682 and notes 22-27, and its adaptation in Johnson, id. at 683
and notes 31-43); Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 277, 341-48 (1982) (analyzing Lindy court's treatment of lodestar
concept).
48. Lindy 1, 487 F.2d at 167-68.
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amount of hours worked by a reasonable rate of compensation. 49
In addition, the court found that two other factors must be considered
to properly compute the value of the attorney's services: the con-
tingent nature of success and the quality of the attorney's work.50
These factors established in Lindy" have been combined and used
throughout the circuits in labor, antitrust, freedom of information
and Title VII cases. 52
Following the Lindy decision, the third circuit reversed and re-
manded a district court's award of an attorney fee in part because
the district court failed to consider the quality of the attorney's
work when establishing the hourly rate.53 The circuit court instructed
49. Id.
50. See id. at 168 (these two factors are considered by the court in adjusting
lodestar amount in order to properly compensate attorney for his services).
51. The court in Lindy vacated the district court's award of attorney's fees and
remanded the case to the district court. 487 F.2d at 170. On remand, the district
court entered new awards. 382 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1974). These awards were
appealed. 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
The court-in Lindy expounded on the issues to be considered in analyzing the
two factors to be applied to the lodestar amount. 540 F.2d at 117-18. Under the
category of "the contingent nature of success," a court may increase the "lodestar"
computation by carefully evaluating the following criteria: (1) the plaintiff's burden
(complexity of case, probability of defendant's liability, evaluation of difficulty of
proving damages); (2) risks assumed in developing the case (number of hours risked
without guarantee of remuneration, amount of out-of-pocket expenses advanced,
prior expertise in area of litigation); and (3) delay in receipt of payment for services
rendered. 540 F.2d at 117.
Under the category of "quality of attorney's work," the court should appraise
the way in which the attorney discharged his professional responsibilities. Id.
52. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Title
VII); Maceira v. Pagan, 698 F.2d 38, 39 (1st Cir. 1983) (Landrum-Griffith Act);
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir. 1977) (Sherman
Antitrust Act); Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208, 1213
(3d Cir. 1978) (same); Phillips v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 426 F. Supp.
1156, 1170 (D. Md.) (same), vacated, 556 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1977); Cooper Liquor,
Inc. v. Aldolf Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575, 583 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); Winpisinger
v. Aurora Corp., 469 F. Supp. 782, 786 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (Title I of ERISA);
International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1274
(8th Cir.) (Sherman Antitrust Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); Powell v.
Dep't of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 1192, 1202 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (Freedom of Information
Act); Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobardt Corp., 562 F. Supp. 729, 730 (D. Colo.
1983) (Sherman Antitrust Act); Re: Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F. Supp. 963,
968 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (same).
53. Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208, 1217 (3d Cir.
1978). In Baughman, the court considered an attorney's fee award in a case involving
the alleged black-listing of a truck driver in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Id. at 1209-10.
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the district court to include a consideration of the quality of the
attorney's work when determining the lodestar.54
In Copeland v. Marshall,5  the District of Columbia Circuit con-
sidered both the Johnson elements and the Lindy factors in affirming
a reduced fee in a Title VII case.5 6 The Copeland court emphasized
that the contingency element espoused in Lindy did not refer to a
contingent fee arrangement between plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel
but rather to a percentage increase in the "lodestar" which reflected
the risk taken by counsel that no fee would be obtained. 7 The court
proposed that the quality of representation considered when deter-
mining the lodestar amount takes into account the level of skill
normally expected of an attorney commanding the desired hourly
rate. 58 The court stressed that a quality adjustment of the lodestar
is appropriate only when the representation has been unusually good
or unusually bad.5 9
In addition, the court admonished plaintiff's counsel to document
adequately the amount of work performed before requesting a fee
award andto exercise the same "billing judgment" when billing the
adversary that they would employ in billing a client. 60 The court
also indicated, in a footnote, that a prevailing party should not
include time spent on unsuccessful claims in the list of billable
hours. 6'
In 1984, in Blum v. Stenson, the Supreme Court, relying exten-
sivelyon Hensley, emphasized that computing a lodestar figure and
then adjusting it based on other considerations is an established
practice. 62 The Court indicated that "[blecause acknowledgement of
the 'results obtained' generally will be subsumed within other factors
used to calculate a reasonable fee it normally should not provide
an independent basis for increasing the fee award. ' 63
54. Id. at 1217. The court further determined that both the contingency and
quality factors in this case did not justify the augmentation of the lodestar. Id.
at 1217-19.
55. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 892-93.
58. Id. at 892.
59. Id. at 893.
60. Id. at 891-92.
61. Id.
62. 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1543-44 (1984); see also Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719
F.2d 670, 676-77 (3d Cir. 1983); White v. City of Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 460-
61 (9th Cir. 1983); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 552 (10th Cir. 1983).
63. 104 S. Ct. at 1549.
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C. Degree of Success Analysis
In Nadeau v. Helgemoe,64 inmates of the New Hampshire State
Prison brought a class action alleging unconstitutionally harsh con-
ditions at the New Hampshire State Prison. 65 While the New Hamp-
shire district court 66 initially awarded them injunctive relief by ordering
expansion of the plaintiff's access to library facilities, it dismissed
various other allegations concerning the conditions of confinement.
67
The circuit court affirmed the award of injunctive relief granted by
the district court and remanded the case for closer scrutiny of the
conditions of confinement. 68
Before a retrial, the parties agreed to a consent decree which
resulted in changed conditions of confinement. On the basis of this
limited success, plaintiffs' counsel moved for an award of attorney's
fees under CRAFAA. The district court denied the award on the
grounds that plaintiffs were not prevailing parties; 69 improved con-
ditions in the state prison resulted from the good faith efforts of
the state's assistant attorney general and warden as well as those
of plaintiffs' counsel. 70
In an opinion which sought to analyze the "prevailing party" and
'reasonableness" issues, 7' the appellate court remanded the case to
the district court, noting that while the plaintiffs did not succeed
on all issues, their lawsuit was a "catalyst" which improved prison
conditions. Since the plaintiffs succeeded on a "significant issue in
64. 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
65. Id.
66. 423 F. Supp. 1250 (D. N.H. 1976), modified, 561 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1977).
67. Id. at 1266-76.
68. 581 F.2d at 279.
69. The CRAFAA makes clear that only a prevailing party may be awarded
attorney fees. However, it fails to provide meaningful guidelines as to who may
qualify as a prevailing party, stating only that "parties may be considered to have
prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without formally
obtaining relief." Senate Report, supra note 19, at 5.
The Senate Report further states that "[s]uch awards are especially appropriate
where a party has prevailed on an important matter in the course of litigation,
even when he ultimately does not prevail on all issues." Id. See supra note 22 for
selected cases allowing fee awards to parties who have enjoyed only limited success
on the merits. See generally L. BARTELL, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES 1111-27, reprinted in CIVIL PRACTICE. IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS (ALI-
ABA Course of Study Materials 1984); S. NAHMAD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES
§ 1.19 (Supp. 1984).
70. 581 F.2d at 278-79.
71. See supra notes 22, 31 and accompanying text for discussions of prevailing
party and reasonableness concepts,
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litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in
bringing the suit," they were entitled to receive a fee award as
prevailing parties.72 Although the circuit court acknowledged the
lower court's discretion to adjust the amount of the award,73 it
cautioned that plaintiff's counsel should receive fees only for the
work performed on successfully litigated issues and then only if their
claims were supported by adequate documentation. 74
III. Special Circumstances Which May Preclude
Awards of Attorney's Fees
The circuit courts have limited attorney's fee awards based upon
a finding of special circumstances. 5 The court in Nadeau v. Helgemoe76
stated that, if the plaintiffs' filing is superfluous or if the plaintiffs'
allegations already have been favorably resolved prior to filing, a
denial of fee awards would be justified. 7 Likewise, if the court
determined that the defendants took action beneficial to the plaintiffs
72. 581 F.2d at 278-79.
73. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
74. 581 F.2d at 279. The second circuit has most closely adhered to Nadeau's
"degree of success" rationale. See McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1983). The seventh circuit also has adopted the "degree of success" rationale. See
Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 521 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
Although the fourth circuit adopted the Johnson elements, particularly empha-
sizing the first five, it has applied a "discretionary" approach to the district court's
determination of reasonableness offee awards. See Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d
246, 249 (4th Cir. 1981). As with the majority of circuits prior to Hensley, the
fourth circuit emphasized the prevailing party aspect of fees, measuring the degree
of the benefit received against the "benchmark" benefit sought. See Bonnes v.
Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (4th Cir. 1979).
The third, fifth, and eleventh circuits prior to Hensley demonstrated more
concern for the determination of the prevailing party than in directing the discretion
of the district courts. In the third circuit, a plaintiff who obtained only some of
the relief sought prevailed. See NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 689 F.2d
1161, 1166-67 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1052 (1983). The fifth and
eleventh circuits applied the Johnson elements but also required the prevailing
plaintiff to acquire the primary benefit sought, either formally or informally. See
Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 669 (5th Cir. 1981); Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d
1375, 1381 (lth Cir. 1982); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
75. While the legislative history of the CRAFAA does not indicate what would
constitute "special circumstances," several circuit courts have attempted to invest
the terms with meaning. See infra notes Section III. The CRAFAA's legislative
history indicates that the prevailing civil rights litigant "should ordinarily recover
an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust."
Senate Report, supra note 19, at 4-5, quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
76. 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
77. Id. at 281.
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when not legally required to do so, the plaintiffs could not have
prevailed .78
Similarly, in Chastang v. Flynn and Emrich Co., 7 9 the fourth
circuit determined that the district court80 had not abused its discretion
in refusing to award attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs since the
circumstances of the case did not warrant such a grant.8 In Chastang,
retired male employees of the defendant companies successfully
brought a sex discrimination case alleging that the retirement plan
in which they participated discriminated in favor of female em-
ployees.82 In affirming the district court's denial of attorney's fees,
the circuit court stated that in view of the fact the defendant company
had amended its retirement plan to eliminate sex discrimination before
the plaintiffs' suits were filed, the plaintiffs could not be said to
have derived any benefits from the litigation.83 Also, it was apparent
that the company had not intentionally violated the civil rights law
as its retirement plan was formulated before the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission8 4 held that compulsory retirement ages based
on sex were illegal.85
According to the "bright prospects" standard of the second and
,ninth circuits,86 courts may deny attorney's fees in cases in which
78. Id. Recently, the fifth circuit stated that
a plaintiff who achieves the goal sought in a civil rights suit by voluntary
action of the defendant prevails within the meaning of the Act if she
demonstrates that the suit caused the defendant to act, unless the de-
fendant proves that the plaintiff's claim had no colorable merit and the
defendant made the change gratuitously for reasons unrelated to the
potential merit of the suit.
Hennigan v. Ouachita Parish School Bd., 749 F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir. 1985).
79. 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976).
80. 365 F. Supp. 957 (D. Md. 1973), supplemental order 381 F. Supp. 1348
(D. Md. 1974).
81. 541 F.2d at 1042-45.
82. Id. The plaintiffs brought the case under Title VIt of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and, therefore, sought to recover attorney's fees pursuant to that statute's
attorney's fees provision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1981). See supra note 39 for
text of the statute.
83. 541 F.2d at 1045.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4, -5 (1981). "The Commission is empowered, as here-
inafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unlawful employment
practice ...... Id.
85. 541 F.2d at 1045. "Notwithstanding that the Act became effective on July
2, 1965, EEOC did not take the position that differences in optional or compulsory
retirement ages based on sex violated Title VII until February 21, 1968. See 29
C.F.R. § 1604.31." Id.
86. Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979); Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d
1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); see Comment, Attorney's
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the prospects of success are sufficiently high to attract competent
private counsel without the incentive provided by CRAFAA.87 The
second circuit, affirming the denial of attorney's fees in Zarcone v.
Perry, asserted that the district court"s did not abuse its discretion
in denying fees. It reached this conclusion after examining the benefits
conferred by the plaintiffs' action on the public or other non-parties,
the nature and extent of the rights and interests at stake in his suit,
the presence or absence of bad faith on the part of either party,
and any unjust hardship that a grant or denial of fee-shifting might
impose.
89
The seventh circuit, in Pigeaud v. McLaren,90 affirmed the denial
of attorney's fees in an action in which a defendant made an offer
of judgment that included nominal damages of one dollar to the
plaintiff without making an admission of liability. The plaintiff
unconditionally accepted the offer of judgment without any mention
of attorney's fees. 9' The court found that this unconditional ac-
ceptance of the settlement offer despite its conspicuous lack of
admission of liability prevented the plaintiff from qualifying as a
prevailing party. 92 The court reasoned that the district court93 properly
Fees in Damage Actions Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 332, 335 (1980).
For an explanation and application of Zarcone, see generally Wheatley v. Ford,
679 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (2d Cir. 1982); Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 82-83 (2d
Cir. 1981).
87. Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039; 1044 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979). The court, referring to the statute's goal of encouraging injured
parties to sue to vindicate their rights, see supra note 3, stated that
the Supreme Court has made it clear that in determining whether attorneys'
fees should be awarded to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff, the principal
factor to be considered by the trial judge in exercising his discretion is
whether a person in the plaintiff's position would have been deterred or
inhibited from seeking to enforce civil rights without an assurance that
his attorneys' fees would be paid if he were successful.
Id.
The court added that where a plaintiff's "prospects of success are sufficiently bright
to attract competent private counsel on a contingent fee basis," the rationale
underlying the statute "may be inapplicable, since no financial disincentive or bar
to vigorous enforcement of civil rights may exist." Id.
88. 438 F. Supp. 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
89. Zarcone, 581 F.2d at 1044.
90. 699 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983).
91. Id. at 402. The offer provided in part that "[n]othing in this Offer shall
be construed as an admission of liability. To the contrary, this Offer is made in
the interest of judicial economy to the Court, the parties, and their attorneys."
Id.
92. Id.
93. 92 F.R.D. 754, 757 (N.D. I11. 1981).
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denied the plaintiff's subsequent motion for attorney's fees. 94
In yet another case, 95 plaintiffs who were successful in having a
local curfew declared unconstitutional were denied attorney's fees
because the court decided that their complaint did not rise to a
level of national priority or constitutional dimension necessary to
justify such an award. 96 The district court decided that if the fee
award were made on such an insubstantial basis, it would encourage
the "wholesale scramble by lawyers to challenge possibly thousands
of ancient and ineffectual municipal ordinances, on the expectation
that counsel fees must be awarded automatically." 97
The "special circumstances" cases discussed in this section, con-
stitute an exception to the general rule permitting recovery. With
the exception of the "bright prospects" 98 standard in the second
and ninth circuits, no federal circuit adheres to a specific "special
circumstance" test. A practitioner can benefit from this analysis by
using the facts of a "special circumstance" case to buttress a defense
against a fee award or to distinguish a "special circumstance" case
from a case in which a prevailing party requests a fee award.
IV. The Supreme Court Reevaluates Attorney's Fee Awards in
Civil Rights Cases: Hensley v. Eckerhart
A. Background and Lower Court Decision
In 1972, the plaintiffs, representing a class of all persons invo-
luntarily confined at the Forensic Unit of the State Hospital in
Fulton, Missouri, filed an action against unit officials at the unit
and members of the Missouri Mental Health Commission alleging
unconstitutional treatment and conditions in the hospital.99 The court
94. 699 F.2d at 402.
95. Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 433 F. Supp. 1369, 1371 (N.D.N.Y. 1976).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1371.
98. See supra notes 80-89.
99. Eckerhart v. Hensley, No. 75-CV-87-C, slip op. (W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 1981),
aff'd without opinion, 664 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1981). Count I complained of six
areas of treatment or conditions in the forensic unit which the respondents alleged
were unconstitutional. Count II alleged procedural due process violations in patient
placement at the Biggs Building of the forensic unit. Count III alleged that patients
who performed institutional labor should be compensated for their work. Count
II was settled by consent decree in December 1973 and Count III was rendered
moot when the petitioners began compensating patients for their maintenance labor
at the institution. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1983).
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found constitutional violations in five of the six areas of treatment
or conditions at the forensic unit.' °° The petitioners did not appeal
the district court's decision on the merits.' 0'
Attorneys for the class sought fees at a standard hourly rate
ranging from forty to sixty-five dollars per hour, amounting to
$150,477.85 plus a thirty to fifty percent enhancement of the award
and costs in the amount of $15,177.40.102 In response to objections
by state officials that the class had not succeeded in every claim,,
the court stated that the class had received substantial relief and
rejected a "mechanical division" of claimed hours between those
issues on which the class prevailed and those in which the state
officials prevailed. 03 The court rejected an apportionment approach
of fees as failing to consider "the relative importance of various
issues, the interrelation of the issues, the difficulty in identifying
issues, or the extent to which a party may prevail on various
issues. ' ° 104According to the court, the significance of the case could
not be measured solely in terms of dollars and cents, and the class
of involuntarily confined patients at the forensic unit had obtained
"substantial" relief. 0 5 Although the court granted no fee enhance-
ment, 0 6 it awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $133,332.25 in
addition to the costs requested. The court reduced the fee of one
attorney by thirty percent because of his lack of experience and
failure to keep contemporaneous records. 07
B. The Supreme Court's "Partially Prevailing Party" Analysis
The Supreme Court, in Hensley, stated that the CRAFAA's leg-
islative history did not establish a standard for setting the amount
of a fee award where the plaintiff achieved only partial success. 08
The class subsequently voluntarily dismissed its action and filed a two-count
complaint seeking damages equalling the value of past patient labor and reiterating
the allegations of unconstitutional treatment and conditions at the forensic unit.
The plaintiffs dismissed the count seeking back-pay. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 426-27 (1983).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 428.
102. See id.
103. Eckerhart v. Hensley, No. 75-CV-87-C, slip op. at 7-8.
104. Id. at 7.
105. Id. at 6.
106. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lindy.
107. Eckerhart, slip op. at 13-14.
108. 461 U.S. at 429-30. See Senate Report, supra note 19, at 6, indicating that
factors such as those enumerated in Johnson, see supra note 43 and accompanying
19851
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
The Court also noted that standards adopted varied among the
circuits regarding fee awards which would be granted when a plaintiff
did not succeed on all claims. 09
Although the Court was satisfied that the district court had ad-
equately justified Nadeau's"° threshold requirement that the plaintiffs
were prevailing parties for purposes of fee awards, the majority felt
that the district court did not clearly answer two relevant questions:
"First, did the plaintiffs fail to prevail on claims that were unrelated
to the claims in which they succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff
achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended
a satisfactory basis for making a fee award?""'
In the majority's opinion, unrelated claims which could be treated
as though they were raised in separate lawsuits might be infrequent. "12
Under these circumstances, it might become difficult for an attorney
to divide the hours expended in that litigation on a claim-by-claim
basis. The Court decided that the district court should focus on the
overall relief obtained in relation to the hours expended." 3 Litigants
could pursue alternative legal grounds to achieve the desired outcome,
and the trial court should not reduce a fee because of a litigant's
failure to prevail on every issue. On the other hand, the "lodestar""11 4
might be excessive even when a plaintiff's claims were "interrelated,
text, should be employed in determining a fee award. For a general discussion of
Hensley, see Casenote, In an Action Brought on the Basis of the Deprivation of
Constitutionally Protected Civil Rights, the Extent of a Plaintiff's Success is a
Crucial Factor in Determining the Proper Amount of an A ward of Attorneys' Fees
under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988-Hensley v.
Eckerhart (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1983), 34 DRAKE L. REV. 241 (1984-85).
109. 461 U.S. at 424-32.
110. 581 F.2d 275, 278-79. The Nadeau court stated that "plaintiffs may be
considered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought
in bringing suit." Id.
Il1. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
112. Id. at 435.
113. Id. The Court stated that:
Many civil rights cases will present only a single claim. In other cases
the plaintiff's claims for relief will involve a common core of facts or
will be based on related legal theories. Much of counsel's time will be
devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to
divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis .... [T]he district
court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by
the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.
Id. at 435.
114. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lindy.
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nonfrivolous and raised in good faith."" 5 The critical factor in either
case is the extent of success.
In an effort to clarify contradictory approaches about the rela-
tionship between claims, the Court stated that in complex civil rights
litigation the range of possible success is often broad and there is
no certain method to determine when claims are related.' 1 6 Although
parties requesting fees probably will not be required to keep a detailed
minute-by-minute accounting of attorney time expended on inter-
related claims, the responsibility to provide a cogent explanation of
its reasons for a fee award remains with the district court. This
explanation must clarify the relationship between the amount of the
fee awarded and the party's degree of success."17
The Court agreed with the district court's refusal to apportion
the fee award, stating that the lower court's decision might be
consonent with the Supreme Court's opinion." 8 However, since the
district court failed to consider the relationship between the extent
of success and the amount of the fee award, the Supreme Court
refused to affirm." 9 The Court indicated that the degree of prevailing
party's success is crucial to the amount of fees to be awarded.120
V. The Effect of Hensley on the Federal Courts
A. Impact on the Prevailing Party Issue
In cases concerning a variety of fee-shifting statutes, the circuit
and district courts have applied Hensley in many different ways.' 21
Particularly interesting are the varying interpretations of Hensley's
115. Hensley, 421 U.S. at 436.
116. Id. at 437 n.12.
117. Id. at 437.
118. Id. at 438. The district court, noting that the recovery obtained at trial
was substantial:
declined to divide the hours worked between winning and losing claims,
stating that this fails to consider "the relative importance of various
issues, the interrelation of the issues, or the extent which a party may
prevail on various issues." [Record] at 220. Finally, the court assessed
the "amount involved/results obtained" and declared: "Not only should
[respondents] be considered prevailing parties, they are parties who have
obtained relief of significant import."
461 U.S. at 438.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See infra notes 124-63 and accompanying text.
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approval of the threshold prevailing party test enunciated in Na-
deau. 122
Cases involving the Equal Access to Justice Act 1 3 cite Hensley to
justify the award of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs who
succeed on any significant litigated issue thereby achieving some of
the benefits sought. 24 On the other hand, at least one circuit has
used Hensley's "results obtained" test to affirm the denial of fees
where the plaintiffs had obtained some success but were unsuccessful
in the central issue of the case.125
B. Related v. Unrelated Issues
Most of the courts which have dealt with the issue of interrelated
claims have tended to relate rather than disassociate claims in order
to grant fees to prevailing plaintiffs.' 26 In a typical formulation, the
Massachusetts District Court, in Pinshaw v. Monk, 27 granted fees
to a prevailing plaintiff, a physician, who alleged that the defendant
police officer Monk and others deprived him of his civil rights. The
jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict of $3,500 against Monk and
exonerated Monk's supervisors. The plaintiff requested fees in the
amount of $7,194.17 for the service of two lawyers, one of whom
represented him in the civil rights action and the other in bankruptcy
proceeding in which Monk attempted to discharge Pinshaw's judg-
122. Hensley, 421 U.S. at 433; see also Rose v. Nebraska, 748 F.2d 1258, 1264
(8th Cir. 1984); Environment Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915, 919 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); Powell v. U.S. Department of Justice, 569 F. Supp. 1192, 1197 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
123. Pub. L. No. 96-431, 94 Stat. 2325 (Title. 5, § 504; Title 15, § 634b; Title
28, § 2412; Title 42, § 1988) (1980).
124. Austin v. Dep't of Commerce, 742 F.2d 1417, 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Environment Defense Fund, Inc. v. E.P.A., 716 F.2d at 915-19 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Powell, 569 F. Supp. at 1197.
125. Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Conn, 718 F.2d 182, 185,
186 (6th Cir. 1983).
126. Odum v. Clark, 748 F.2d 1538, 1540-41 (lth Cir. 1984); Impro Prods.,
Inc. v. Block, 569 F. Supp. 1389, 1396 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,
737 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1119 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1282 (1984); Webb v. County Bd. of Educ.
of Dyer County, Tennessee, 715 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1983), appeal pending;
National Trust for Historic Preservation v. Corps of Eng'rs, 570 F. Supp. 465,
470 (S.D. Ohio 1983). But see Martin v. Lauer, 740 F.2d 36, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("attorneys' fee award should not include compensation for work on the whistle-
blower claim that was only tangentially related to the First Amendment claim").
127. 565 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D. Mass. 1983).
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ment. 2s After considering all of the pertinent factors, the court
granted an attorney's fee of only $5,356.17.129
The court rejected the defendant's position that it was inappro-
priate to grant attorney's fees to plaintiff's representative in the
bankruptcy proceeding. 30 The court considered the determination of
the bankruptcy issue to be inextricably intertwined with vindication
of the plaintiff's civil rights claim. Compensation would have been
diluted unjustly had the bankruptcy proceeding discharged the ul-
timate judgment debt. 131
The defendant also sought to have the court apportion the fee
award according to the plaintiff's success since it prevailed on other
issues including culpability of Monk's superiors and the issue of
punitive damages against the officer. The court acknowledged Monk's
incomplete success, but maintained that, "although there were suc-
cessful and unsuccessful claims, the attorneys' [efforts] necessarily
overlapped on all. The claims then were not distinct in all respects."' 32
C. The "Billing Judgment" Rule
In spite of the trend not to exclude fees for unsuccessful related
claims, many cases emphasize "billing judgment" as a means to
moderate the amount of attorney's fee award.'3 3 In Capozzi v. City
of Albany, 3 4 the Northern District of New York court agreed that
unsuccessful related claims should be included in fee awards but
ultimately reduced the fee award with an "eye to moderation."'13
Of the five claims made by the plaintiff ranging from federal civil
rights violations to malicious prosecution, the jury returned a special
verdict in the plaintiff's favor only on the issue of a section 1983
128. Id. at 45.
129. Id. at 46.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 47.
133. Blum v. Stensen, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1545-47 (1984). The Court admonished
that attorney's fees "are to be calculated according to prevailing market rates in
the relevant community" rather than the cost of providing legal services. Id.; see
Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's County, 598 F. Supp. 1262, 1280-
81 (D. Md. 1984); Impro Prods., 569 F. Supp. at 1389, 1395; Marie Benitez v.
Collazo, 571 F. Supp. 246, 251 (D. Puerto Rico 1983); Capozzi v. City of Albany,
565 F. Supp. 771, 774, 775 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
134. Capozzi v. City of Albany, 565 F. Supp. 771 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
135. Id. at 774.
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civil rights violation, false arrests, and abuse of process. 36 Verdicts
favorable to the defendants were returned on the claims of battery
and malicious prosecution. Money damages amounted to $25,000.11
Although the defendants did not deny the plaintiff's status as a
prevailing party, they felt that the $41,150 fee requested was ex-
orbitant.'38 In spite of the interrelationship between successful and
unsuccessful claims, the court reduced the fee award requested from
$41,150 to $14,516.139
Other courts have used the duplication of attorney effort as jus-
tification for reducing the amount of attorney's fee awards. 40 In
Singer v. Hunt, 4' decided in the Western District Court of North
Carolina, a class of handicapped minors sued the Governor and
other state officials in order to obtain certain services and treatment.
As in the Pinshaw42 and Capozzi, 43 the district court rejected the
defendants' position that the 1339.10 legal hours spent on a case
by eight different lawyers should have been reduced by the 307
hours of time spent litigating two issues which the plaintiffs ultimately
lost.'" The court stated that the plaintiffs' unsuccessfully litigated
claims were integrally related to the resulting consent decree which
provided millions of dollars worth of services to class members.
45
Consequently, the court did not reduce the recovery of attorneys'
fees for time expended on unsuccessful claims but did reduce the
total legal hours to 1,250 based on the possibility that some of the
time spent was duplicative or unnecessary.
146
D. The Adequate Documentation Rule
Courts are concerned to a greater degree now that only well-
documented requests for fees will be submitted. A review of district
136. Id.
137. Id. at 773.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 774-75.
140. Benitez, 571 F. Supp. at 251; National Trust for Historic Preservation, 570
F. Supp. at 471; Singer v. Hunt, 564 F. Supp. 363, 367 (W.D.N.C. 1983), modified,
732 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1984).
141. Singer v. Hunt, 564 F. Supp. at 363.
142. For a discussion of this case in the context of the post-Hensley trend to
grant fees to plaintiffs who partially prevail in related issues, see supra notes 127-
32 and accompanying text.
143. For a discussion of this case in the context of the post-Hensley trend to
use "billing judgment" in fee awards, see supra notes 133-39 and accompanying
text. See also Singer, 564 F. Supp. at 365.
144. Singer, 564 F. Supp. at 365.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 367.
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court cases since Hensley reveals that often courts will list in detail
the components of the "lodestar" before granting a fee. 47 At least
one circuit has held that contemporaneous time records are a pre-
requisite for the award of attorneys' fees.
48
E. The Continuation of Enhancement
Supported by Hensley dicta 149 which approved the use of multipliers
for "extraordinary success," the pre-Hensley trend to grant fees
with multipliers continues. 50 Although in some cases courts have
reduced the fee enhancements as excessive or have offset themby
reductions for duplication or lack of contemporaneous records, the
award of multipliers probably will continue. '5
F. Mathematical Approach
In different cases, the eighth circuit used Hensley as the basis to
award defendants attorney's fees and to grant a fee award to the
prevailing plaintiff.12 In Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co.,
147. Many of the cases referred to actually detail what legal time was used for
what purpose. See, e.g., Vaughns v. Bd. Of Educ. of Prince George's County,
598 F. Supp. 1262, 1280 (D. Md. 1984).
148. Wojtkowski v. Cade, 725 F.2d 127, 130 (1st Cir. 1984); Jones v. Amal-
gamated Warbasse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881, 885 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1929 (1984); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v.
Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147 (2d Cir. 1983); Birmingham v. Sogen-Swiss Int'l Corp.
Retirement Plan, 718 F.2d 515, 524 (2d Cir. 1983); Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm.
v. Ross-Rodney Hous. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 509, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
149. 461 U.S. at 435.
150. The Hensley dicta was reiterated by the Court in Blum v. Stenson, 104 S.
Ct. 1541, 1550 (1984): "In sum, we reiterate what was said in Hensley: "where a
plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compen-
satory fee. Normally, this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litiga-
tion, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhancement award may
be justified. " Id. (emphasis added); see New York Ass'n for Retarded Children,
Inc., 711 F.2d at 1154; National Trust for Historic Preservation, 570 F. Supp. at
472; Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 570 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (W.D.N.C.
1983); Martino v. Carey, 568 F. Supp. 848, 852 (D. Ore. 1983); Powell, 569 F. Supp.
1192, 1202, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
151. For an example of a case in which a multiplier was reduced as excessive,
see National Trust for Historic Preservation, 570 F. Supp. at 472. For cases
containing both percentage enhancements and deductions, see Coble v. Texas Dep't
of Corrections, 568 F. Supp. 410, 413, 414 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (one lawyer fee was
enhanced by 50%lo while another was reduced by 5007o); National Trust for Historic
Preservation, 570 F. Supp. at 471, 472 (both a reduction of enhancement requested
from 100% to 25076 and a 1507o reduction in fee because of duplication of effort).
152. American Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v. Teasdale, 564 F.
Supp. 1571 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (assessed fees against plaintiff based on frivolous
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
Inc.,"' a construction company employee filed suit alleging that his
employment was unlawfully terminated due to racial discrimination.
He also alleged unlawful retaliation by the employer due to his
opposition to what he perceived to be racial discrimination within
the company. 154
The district court held that the employer had neither unlawfully
discriminated nor retaliated against the plaintiff. 5 On appeal, the-
circuit court affirmed the discrimination decision but remanded the
adverse judgment on the retaliation issue holding that the plaintiff
was entitled to trial by jury with respect to that claim. 5 6 On remand,
the parties settled prior to trial, and the plaintiff received $30,000
in settlement of his claim. The plaintiff then moved for attorneys'
fees in the amount of $64,562, the lodestar, plus an enhancement
factor of fifty percent. 5 7
The court rejected any enhancement, stating that a multiplier was
only justified in cases of exceptional success.' 58 The court further
decided that the lodestar was not reasonably related to the results
received because it more than doubled the damages awarded. 159 The
court granted an award of forty percent of the actual damages, the
same percentage agreed to by the prevailing plaintiff and his attorney
in their contigency contract.' 60 Significantly, the court noted that
the award effectuated the congressional purpose of enabling plaintiffs
to protect their civil rights while preventing a windfall to plaintiffs'
attorneys at the expense of defendants.' 6' This case may seem an
anomaly to those familiar with the fees granted by courts prior to
Hensley. In fact, Sisco echoed the admonition contained in the
CRAFAA legislative history 62 that the fee-shifting statutes were
action brought against former Missouri Governor), aff'd, 733 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.
1984); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 564 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Mo. 1983)
(concerns award of fees to plaintiff as prevailing party), rev'd and remanded, 733
F.2d 55 (1984).
153. Sisco, 564 F. Supp. at 765.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 655 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982).
157. 546 F. Supp. at 766-67.
158. Id. at 767; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.
159. Sisco, 564 F. Supp. at 767.
160. Id. at 767-68.
161. Id. at 768.
162. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 6, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONC.
& AD. NEws 5913. It must be noted, however, that the appellate court determined
that the amount awarded by the district court was too high (since a contingency
fee arrangement was involved). 733 F.2d 55, 57 (8th Cir. 1984).
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designed to provide a reasonable fee to the prevailing party, thereby
encouraging injured parties to act.
in the second appeal of King v. McCord,163 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed an award of $11,954.94 in attorneys'
fees plus $6,963.17 in expenses to a plaintiff who had obtained a
damage award of $6,504.60. The plaintiff brought the second appeal
on the issue of attorney's fees, alleging that the amount awarded
was disproportionately low with respect to her level of success on
interrelated claims.6 The court, engaging in a purely mathematical
calculation to determine the extent of success, affirmed the district
court's award which corresponded to the proportion of the plaintiff's
success.1 65 Although this decision may be one logical extension of
Hensley, the issue is significant as well. Instead of a defendant
attempting to overturn a fee, a prevailing plaintiff was complaining
that the fee award was not enough.
VI. Conclusion
Perhaps the only unambiguous effect of Hensley is its reaffirmation
of the viability of the American Rule.166 In the final analysis, the
most that a practitioner may glean from Hensley is a minor qual-
ification of Alyeska. The latter case squarely placed the responsibility
on the legislature for carving out exceptions to the American Rule.
Congress listened, and by an amendment, placed the 1866 Civil
Rights statutes on the same footing with more recently passed fee-
shifting statutes. 67 Unfortunately, in the post-Alyeska period, "rea-
sonableness" sometimes became "exorbitance." Emphasis changed
from lodestar to enhancement. Degree of success often became
enmeshed in the concept of the "catalyst" by which a private citizen
might vindicate federally protected rights and receive a reasonable
fee for all efforts, without regard to the extent of success.
Hensley declared its purpose to be clarification of the reasona-
bleness of attorney's fee awards in the case of the partially prevailing
plaintiff. It failed in that purpose. While it sought to direct an
award of fees only for unrelated claims upon which plaintiff pre-
vailed, the Court understood that it might be impossible in a given
case to distinguish between claims.' 61
163. King v. McCord, 707 F.2d 466 (11th Cir. 1983).
164. Id. at 467.
165. Id. at 468.
166. See supra note 1.
167. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429.
168. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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The effect of Hensley has been a variety of interpretations by the
federal courts of the meaning and implications of the decision. The
"partially prevailing" plaintiff either wins a complete fee if successful
in a significant issue in controversy or may receive a reduced fee
if a court can find distinct issues. Some courts now have developed
billing judgment rules and strict documentation requirements169 to
develop a reasonable lodestar while others continue to grant mul-
tipliers.'70
Contrary to the Hensley dissenters' fears, Hensley has enhanced
not intruded upon the lower court's discretionary award of attorneys'
fees.' 7 ' The dissenters correctly feared an increase in litigation'
which the majority hoped would be discouraged by Hensley.'73 The
Hensley litigants chose to settle before beginning "Hensley I,"' 74
but it is likely that there will be more litigation.
Courts have become more conscious of the necessity to provide
cogent reasons for the award or refusal to award attorneys' fees.
For the practitioner, defense counsel might feel justifiably that the
"reasonable" pendulum is swinging towards moderation. Prevailing
plaintiffs' counsel should not expect unopposed fee requests when
documentation and related and unrelated issues are subject to stricter
scrutiny. Meanwhile, litigation over fee awards will increase.
169. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
169. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34; see also New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc., 711 F.2d at 1154.
170. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.
171. See id. at 442.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 437.
174. After inquiring, I discovered that the Hensley parties had settled their dispute
over the fee amount, but agreed not to disclose the amount of the settlement. In
all likelihood, the prevailing plaintiffs did not receive as much as they sought, and
the defendants paid more than they wanted. The parties apparently followed the
Hensley majority's recommendation.
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